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I. Issues in Credit Rationing 
Much current interest in rural financial markets in the 
Philippines is focused on whether the deregulated financial 
system has successfully brought about economic efficiency and 
growth, two major objectives of the financial reforms of the 
1980s. Specifically, the reforms should have brought about more 
efficient financial intermediation. This would make access to 
loanable funds easier for all types of borrowers, thereby 
bringing about increased investments and higher productivity 
among the economic units in the country. 
Recent studies of the credit market have shown that the 
lifting of interest rate controls still failed to produce the 
desired results. In a study by Lamberte (1987), it was shown 
that the credit needs of borrowers, particularly small farmers, 
have not been met despite the increase in financial resources 
mobilized in rural areas. The borrowers' major complaint was 
the lack of credit rather than its price, implying that banks do 
not lend to just anybody who can afford the price of credit. 
Moreover, the financial reports of banks show that their loan 
portfolio did not keep up with the modest growth of loanable 
funds. Clearly, banks appear to exercise some degree of "credit 
rationing" by non-price mechanisms. 
The expected efficiency and growth in the financial system 
under a deregulated environment is premised on one important 
condition of the classical equilibrium theory, that is, the 
tendency or ability of the market to achieve equilibrium when 
p_rices (in this case, interest rates) are allowed to vary 
according to market forces. But recent literature on financial 
markets question this contention and instead put forward the 
notion that interest rates can successfully steer the system 
toward equilibrium only when there is perfect information in the 
financial market. In the absence of perfect information, 
interest rates alone cannot do the job (see Jaffee and Russell 
[1976], Bester [1985], and Cho [1986]). 
When interest rates are controlled, banks automatically 
ration credit through non-price means, as shown by Gonzales-Vega 
(1976) and Tybout (1984). However, even if interest rate 
controls have been lifted, the existence of imperfect information 
in credit markets creates risk and therefore makes credit 
rationing rational, profit-maximizing behavior for banks. This is 
the issue addressed in this paper. It is argued that prevailing 
circumstances resulting from the existence of imperfect 
information make it necessary for banks to apply credit rationing 
in their lending operations. Credi.t rationing occurs when loan 
demand is greater than supply, therefore some borrowers receive 
no loans or less than the amount applied for. 
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The main objective of this study is to provide empirical 
support for the continued existence of credit rationing in a 
deregulated financial system. This study will establish the 
existence of credit rationing among banks in the rural financial 
markets of the Philippines, and determine the rationing mech-
anisms used by each type of bank, namely: rural banks, private 
development banks, and branches of commercial banks, in allocat-
ing credit. The intensity and incidence of credit rationing 
among these banks will also be compared. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses 
relevant theoretical considerations. Section III describes and 
analyzes the screening and rationing behavior of the three types 
of banks. The test for the intensity and incidence of credit 
rationing is discussed in Section IV. Conclusions and pertinent 
policy implications are set forth in Section V. 
II. Theoretical Considerations 
Bank lending behavior can be divided into three stages, 
namely: the screening stage, the acceptance/rejection rationing 
stage, and the quantity rationing stage. 
The screening stage occurs at the counter (or in the office) 
before any loan application is filled out. This screening is 
generally the responsibility of the bank manager who interviews 
loan applicants to determine their eligibility for credit. During 
this interview. the manager probes into the applicant's personal 
background to establish his creditworthiness, as well as the 
applicants' loan requirements and the terms desired. The manager 
decides whether the applicant is sufficiently qualified to apply 
for a loan. Note that the manager's decision is crucial at this 
stage. The quality of the applicants he chooses as possible 
applicants will affect the bank's risk exposure, as well as the 
degree of rationing that will result after the loan applications 
have been processed and evaluated. Hence, the quality of 
screening that occurs at the screening stage is affected by the 
qualifications of the bank manager, e.g., his educational 
background, banking experience, familiarity with people in the 
community, among others. 
The subsequent formal rationing process is subdivided into 
two more rationing stages. The first rationing stage after 
screening takes place once the loan applications are accepted, 
processed, and evaluated to determine which among the loan 
applications will be approved and which will be rejected. With 
the additional information about the applicant gathered from the 
application form and credit investigations undertaken by loan 
officers, the bank can draw up a profile of the applicant 
indicating whether it would be profitable for the bank to grant 
the loan. If the initial screening process was efficiently 
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carried out by the manager, then no applicant will be rationed 
out at this stage. However, theory suggests that no perfect 
screening can be done because of imperfect information. Screen-
ing can only improve the quality of the pool of applicants and 
indicate who among the applicants are "good" or "safe" on the 
basis of the manager's initial subjective judgment. It cannot 
completely eliminate the bank's uncertainty over the probability 
of default associated with each loan applicant. 
Once the decision is made on creditworthiness, the bank then 
decides on how much will be granted to each applicant during this 
final stage of rationing, i.e., the quantity-rationing stage. At 
this stage, the bank determines the optimal loan size for a 
borrower at a given interest rate. Generally, the bank re-
stricts the size of the loan according to a combination of 
several factors such as the lender's evaluation of the prob-
ability of repayment, the interest rate charged, the marginal 
cost of granting the loan, and the value of the collateral 
offered, among others. It is during this quantity- rationing 
stage that the bank finetunes the loan contract to reflect the 
lender's subjective evaluation of the riskiness of the loan and 
of the borrower and the impact of these risks on expected 
profit. 
Considering the stages of lending behavior described above, 
the framework for analyzing credit rationing in this study is 
premised on the argument that interest rate deregulation does not 
automatically result in an exclusively price-determined equi-
librium equating the supply and demand for credit. The existence 
of asymmetric information in financial markets makes credit 
rationing rational behavior among lenders who want to maximjze 
expected profits. This is achieved through lending behavior 
which takes into consideration the interest rate r, the ratio of 
collateral to loan value (C/L), the decision to lend and how 
much to lend. All these elements are combined and captured in a, 
the rationing parameter (i.e., the ratio of the amount received 
to the amount requested). These three parameters in turn, are 
chosen depending on the lender's estimate of p, the borrower's 
probabi 1 i ty of repayment. The parameter p is exogenous to the 
lender and can only be estimated using proxy variables, e.g., 
observable characteristics of the borrowers or manipulable risk 
signals as indicators .of p. The higher is p, the higher the 
chosen a, implying a lesser probability of the borrower being 
rationed, i.e., receiving a loan less than the amount applied 
for. The choice of r and (C/L) is also dependent on p. The 
higher the p, the lower is r or C/L. The relationship can be 
stated as an optimal function a* f(r, C/L, p), where p 
g(Xi, i = 1, ... ,n), and the Xi's are the observable characteris-
tics of the borrower such as asset position, capacity to pay, 
nature of the investment to which the loan will be applied, and 
the type of collateral being offered. The a * function can be 
termed a decision model wherein the bank selects an a * on the 
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basis of r, C/L, and g(Xi, i=l, .. n). Since g(Xi) is exogenous to 
the bank and assuming that C/L is fixed due to bank policy re-
quirements, then, the bank's decision parameters will only be a 
and r. Simultaneity is implied in the relationship between a 
and r due to the effect of p = g(Xi). A borrower with a higher p 
is likely to get a higher a and a lower r and vice-versa. The 
combined effects of r, C/L and g(Xi) on a * will.therefore, 
indicate the rationing behavior of the bank. The details of this 
theoretical framework are discussed in Lapar (1988). 
The data sources for thjs study were the 65 bank respondents 
randomly chosen from eight provinces in the country. Although 
there were orjginally 66 bank respondents in the study, only 65 
were included in the analysis because of lack of information on 
credit rationing from one bank. The 65 bank respondents included 
22 rural banks, 16 private development banks, and 27 branches of 
four commercial banks, namely: the Bank of the Philippine Is-
lands, the United Coconut Planters Bank, the Philippine Commer-
cial International Bank, and Metrobank. The 22 rural banks in-
cluded in this study are composed of good performing, average 
performing, and poorly performing rural banks. As such, they are 
representative of the entire universe of rural banks in the 
country. 
III. The Screening and Rationing Behavior of Banks 
A survey conducted on the 65 bank respondents showed that 
credit rationing does exist in rural financial markets in the 
Philippines, and that differences exist in the rationing and 
lending behavior of the three bank types. 
One significant result from the survey is that the screening 
and acceptance/rejection rationing behavior of branches of 
commercial banks (KBs) and private development banks (PDBs) are 
more restrictive than those for rural banks (RBs) as seen in 
their respective approval rates (see Table 1). For example, on 
line 2 we see that only 58 and 60 applicants out of 100 are 
invited to fill out loan applications in commercial banks (KBs) 
and private development banks (PDBs), respectively. In contrast, 
as many as 90 (out of 100) are invited to do so in rural banks 
(RBs). Also, in the formal processing stage (i.e., acceptance 
and rejection) line 5 shows a slightly higher degree of ration-
ing, namely a lower approval rate for Klis and PDBs than for RBs. 
These differences in the degree of screening and rationing may be 
due to operational differences among these banks. Among these 
differences would be the fact that RB managers generally know 
their customers well and are knowledgeable about the kinds of 
activities for which their clients are borrowing. Furthermore RB 
managers are accustomed to making loans in their areas. Indeed, 
the servicing of loans is the most important part of their job. 
. 
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Table 1. Approval rates for every 100 loan applicants who 
approached Banks in 1986, by type of bank (In percent) 
Screening 
1. No. of loan applicants who approached the 
bank for a loan 
2. No. of loan applicants given applications 
Processing 
3a. No. of loan applications approved by the manager 
KBs 
100 
58 
from total loan applicants. 35 
3b. Approval rate at the manager's level, 
in % (3a/2) 60 
4a. No. of loan applications recommended by 
the manager for approval by the Board of 
Directors (for RBs) or the area or head 
office (for PDBs and KBs) out of total 
loan applications received from loan 
applicants. 18 
4b. No. of loan applications approved by the BOD 
or at the area or head office out of total loan 
applications recommended by the manager 
4c. Approval rate by BOD or at the area or 
head office with respect to the manager's 
recommendations,in % (4b/4a) 
5. Approval rate in processing stage (3a + 4b/2) 
6. Overall approval rate, in (%) 
(3a + 4b)/no. row 1 
18 
100 
91 
53 
Type of Bank 
PDBs 
100 
60 
31 
51 
26 
25 
96 
93 
56 
Source of Data: Comparative Bank Study Survey, 1987. 
(Based on institutional sample of 65 banks.) 
RBs 
100 
90 
83 
92 
3 
3 
100 
96 
86 
All 
100 
70 
55 
79 
11 
]1 
100 
94 
66 
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KB and PDB local managers, on the other hand, are frequently less 
accustomed to local loan activity, are less familiar with 
potential local opportunities and clientele, and, in the case of 
KB managers, are more attuned to mobilizing local deposits for 
the head office (rather than making local loans). Thus, the 
greater incidence of screening and loan rejection for KBs and 
PDBs very likely grows out of their relative bias for greater 
prudence and risk aversion, combined with less institutional 
concern for engaging in local loan activity. 
The data from the 65 bank respondents also show that the 
rationing behavior of the three types of banks is influenced by 
factors such as the capacity to pay, the bank-client relation-
ship, and collateral. RBs exhibit a strong bias towards a well-
developed bank-client relationship in their rationing behavior. 
This can be seen by the high ratio of repeat borrowers among 
those who were granted loans by RBs in 1986, as shown in Table 2. 
This supports our argument above that RB managers are more 
knowledgeable about rural loan activities and know their cus-
tomers well. 
The results obtained from the 65 bank respondents are 
corroborated by the data obtained from the sample of 344 bank 
clients drawn from the PDBs and RBs. This data presents evidence 
on quantity rationing, the third and final stage of our rationing 
process. Unfortunately, samples from KBs were not obtained due 
to limitations on access to client-based bank records. Neverthe-
less, the behavior of KBs is similar to the behavior of PDBs. 
This was seen by the similarities in their rationing and lending 
behavior in the first two stages of rationing discussed earlier. 
While not conclusive, the results provide a gauge on how KBs 
would behave given the same circumstances as RBs and PDBs. The 
data on quantity rationing for PDBs and RBs strongly suggest 
that the degree of quantity rationing among these two banks 
differ because of loan and borrower characteristics considered by 
each bank. 
One interesting result from the data on the 344 bank client 
sample is that the degree of rationing measured by the ratio of 
loan granted to loan requested is minimal for all borrowers of 
PDBs and RBs (see Table 3). This result is consistent with what 
is observed in the screening and rationing behavior of the 65 
bank respondents where the rejection rate is highest at the 
screening stage and the manager is the major decision-maker. In 
most cases, the loan amount requested is discussed and agreed to 
by both the manager and the borrower during this informal 
screening stage. Thus, the borrower is almost always certain of 
getting the loan amount he originally applied for in the subse-
quent rationing stage. Quantity rationing or reducing the amount 
applied for would take place only when the bank discovers certain 
additional characteristics of the borrower, e.g., loan delinquen-
cies with other banks, that would warrant such action. 
. 
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Table 2. 
Ratio (%) 
0 
> 0 - 25 
> 25 50 
> 50 - 75 
7 
The ratio of the total number of loans granted to repeat 
borrowers to the total number of loan applications 
approved in 1986, by type of bank 
Type of Bank 
--------------------------------------
KB PDB RB Total 
----------- ----------- ---------- ----------
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
2 11.8 0 0 1 7.7 3 7.0 
1 5.9 3 23.1 1 7.7 5 11.6 
5 29.4 1 7.7 0 0 6 14.0 
4 23.5 4 30.8 1 7.7 9 20.9 
> 75 but < 100 1 5.9 2 15.4 7 53.8 10 23.3 
100 4 23.5 3 23.1 3 23.1 10 23.3 
Total 17 100.0 13 100.0 13 100.0 43 100.0 
Mean 0.58 0.54 0.81 0.77 
S.D. 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.33 
Median 0.55 0.61 0.90 0.71 
a ·b c d 
No answer 10 37.0 3 18.8 9 40.9 22 33.8 
a - % of total KB respondents (27) 
b - % of total PDB respondents (16) 
c - % of total RB respondents (22) 
d - % of total bank respondents (65) 
Source of Data: Comparative Bank Study Survey, 1987. 
(Based on institutional sample of 65 banks) 
Table 3. 
Status of 
Borrower 
Rationed 
Non-rationed 
Total 
8 
Number of rationed and non-rationed borrowers. 
by type of bank, 1986 
Type of Bank 
PDBs RBs Total 
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
9 12.0 39 14.5 48 14.0 
66 88.0 230 85.5 296 86.0 
75 100.0 269 100.0 344 100.0 
Source of Data: Comparative Bank Study Survey, 1987. 
(Based on sample of 344 bank clients from PDBs and RBs) 
• • 
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IV. A Test for the Intensity and Incidence of Quantity Rationing 
Two types of models were estimated to test for factors that 
explain the quantity-rationing behavior of PDBs and RBs using the 
344 client profi]es. The quantity-rationing model which tests 
for the intensity of rationing is expressed as 
Log L/A f(log INT, log COLL, AREA, log INC, log MAT, log CL, 
DEP. DEL, CCROP, BANK) 
where L/A = ratio of loan amount granted to loan amount applied 
for 
INT 
COLL 
AREA 
INC 
MAT 
CL 
DEP 
DEL 
CCROP 
BANK 
= 
effective interest rate 
market value of the collateral 
area of land owned 
value of total income for the year 
maturity of the loan in number of months 
ratio of collateral value to loan amount granted 
number of dependents 
dummy variable for delinquency record, 
1 for borrower with delinquency record 
0 otherwise 
dummy variable for cash crops 
1 for cash crops 
0 otherwise 
dummy variable for bank type 
1 for PDBs 
0 for RBs 
A two-stage least squares method was used to estimate the 
parameters of the quantity-rationing model to account for the 
simultaneity between the interest rate, INT. and the rationing 
parameter a L/A. as noted in the theoretical framework 
discussed in section II. 
The qualitative-response model on the other hand, predicts 
the probability of a borrower being quantity·-rationed. This 
takes the following form: 
Oi = 0 (ai = 1) = f(r, C/L, p), p g(Xi, i=l, .. ,n) 
where ai = l if a < 1 or L < A 
0 if a = 1 or L A 
This model uses the same explanatory variables as the quantity-
rationing model. To estimate.the parameters of the qualitative-
response model, the logit method was used. 
The best-fit estimates for the two models are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5. Separate equations were estimated per bank type 
because 
result, 
regards 
tests). 
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the bank type dummy variable test yielded a significant 
implying that PDBs behave differently from RBs as 
quantity rationing (see Lapar [1988] for details on 
In terms of quantity rationing in our first model on the 
intensity of rationing, we see that the interest rate, area of 
J and, term structure, number of dependents and cash crops are 
significantly related to the behavior of the dependent variable 
(L/A) for RBs. A positive sign implies less rationing while a 
negative sign implies more restrictive rationing. As interest 
rates rise, or the land area increases in size or the number of 
dependents rises, there is significantly less rationing in RBs 
(i.e. the ratio L/A rises). This is what one would expect. in 
that the rise in interest rates and greater land area (i.e., 
capacity to produce and repay) reduce risk and thus reduce the 
need for quantity rationing. Also, for RBs, a larger family size 
adds to the production potential of a farm borrower and reduces 
his costs and risks, since he does not have to hire outside 
labor. Thus, for a bank with a farm borrower clientele, less 
rationing occurs. On the other hand, as the loan maturity 
lengthens and/or cash crops are financed (coffee, cassava, 
coconuts and sugar), the more severe the quantity rationing (i.e. 
the ratio L/A declines) in RBs, again as we would expect. The 
longer the loan maturity, the greater the risk of loan recovery 
due to the riskier nature of longer term investments. 
For PDBs, as loan maturity lengthens, the customer is also 
rationed (similar to RBs) with a statistically significant 
negative coefficient. However, in contrast to the results for 
RBs, borrowers with more dependents are quantity rationed. This 
is probably due to PDBs being more risk averse to lower income 
traditional farm family borrowers than RBs. Also, borrowers with 
higher collateral/loan ratios (CL) are less likely to be ra-
tioned. In conclusion both RBs and PDBs are sensitive to loan 
maturity and are inclined to ration borrowers with longer term 
loans. RBs, in addition ration cash crop borrowers more than 
non-cash crop borrowers, while PDBs ration borrowers with larger 
size families and lower collateral/loan ratios. 
In the results from the qualitative response model shown in 
Table 5, we should interpret statistically significant coeffi-
cients with a positive sign as indicating a high incidence (or 
probability) of being rationed while a significant negative sign 
implies a strong incidence (or probability) of not being ra-
tioned. For RRs we again find that borrowers of longer term 
loans are more likely to be rationed than those of shorter term 
loans. In contrast, interest rates, size of land area and family 
size are not associated with rationing behavior, but rather just 
the opposite. For PORs a borrower with a high income level and a 
longer term loan has a higher probability of being rationed. 
-. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the effect of loan terms and 
observable characteristics of borrowers on 
intensity of rationing, by type of bank 
Variable 
CONSTANT 
Log INT 
AREA 
Log INC 
Log MAT 
Log CL 
DEP 
CCROP 
F-Stat 
N 
PDBs 
0.907 
(1.636) 
-0.111 
(··1.144) 
-0.030 
(-1.092) 
-0.118 
(-3.428)* 
0.148 
(2.953)** 
-0.034 
(-1.862)*** 
0.347 
5.564* 
44 
Note: Dependent variable z Log (L/A). 
*Significant at 1 percent. 
**Significant at 5 percent. 
***Significant at 10 percent. 
RBs 
-· 0. 2 4 5 
(-0.477) 
0.244 
(2.669)** 
0.004 
(2.191)** 
-0.014 
(-0.448) 
-0.214 
(-2.662)** 
--0. 039 
(--1.258) 
0.028 
(2.570)** 
-0.386 
(-5.288)* 
0.254 
6.794* 
120 
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Table 5. Estimates of the effect of loan terms and 
observable characteristics of borrowers on 
the incidence of rationing, by type of bank 
Variable 
CONSTANT 
Log I NT 
Log COLL 
AREA 
Log I NC 
Log MAT 
Log CL 
DEP 
DEL 
Log likelihood 
Likelihood ratio 
N 
PDBs 
-55.001 
(-2.100)** 
-8.809 
(-1.317) 
2.689 
(1.821)*** 
12.617 
(2.017)** 
0.196 
(0.592) 
-7.238 
14.475* 
54 
Note: Dependent variable ~ 1 if L < A 
0 if L A 
*Significant at 1 percent. 
**Significant at 5 percent. 
***Significant at 10 percent. 
RBs 
3.836 
(0.497) 
-5.661 
(-3.282)* 
-0.344 
(-0.758) 
-0.287 
(-2.453)** 
0.696 
(1.020) 
4.226 
(2.313)** 
0.712 
(1.216) 
-0.311 
(-1.783)*** 
1.544 
(1.180) 
-29.995 
152.682* 
120 
• 
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This is consistent with the known practice of PDBs requiring 
reasonably well off borrowers to participate in longer term loan 
financing through larger equity contributions. Thus, in the end. 
the PDBs expect borrowers who have a greater capacity to pay to 
share part of the risk of their investment financing. 
Before concluding this section, it is important to remember 
that PDBs engaged in far more significant and meaningful initial 
rationing behavior than RBs (i.e., the informal screening stage 
at the counter, and the first formal rationing stage approving or 
rejecting the formal application) since they are more risk averse 
institutions that engage in much less local rural lending than 
RBs. In the third stage (i.e., the quantity rationing stage for 
already approved loans) RB rationing behavior emerges strongly as 
seen in Tables 4 and 5. Thus, during the first two st.ages of 
this three-stage sequence, RB bank managers, relatively speaking, 
are much less likely to engage in screening or rationing behavior 
that implies outright rejection. However, once the loan applica-
tion has been approved in principle, RB managers engage in more 
intense quantity rationing. 
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Results of the two field surveys have established empirical 
support for the existence of credit rationing in the rural finan-
cial markets of the Philippines. These results confirm the 
theoretical argument that credit rationing is still possible in a 
deregulated financial system characterized by imperfect informa-
tion. In the Philippines, this imperfect market for information 
was reinforced by the growing risks of financial activity in the 
recessionary environment of the 1980s. 
As part of their rationing behavior, banks were observed to 
engage in an informal form of rationing or initial screening at 
the counter usually carried out by the bank manager. This 
screening activity was highly practiced by KBs and PDBs, as shown 
by the high rejection rates at this stage of loan applications as 
compared to RBs. In fact, the rejection rates during screening 
were much higher than those in subsequent rationing stages. The 
high incidence of this over-the-counter type of rationing in KBs 
and PDBs, as compared to RBs, implies a more restrictive criteria 
for accepting loan applicants by KBs and PDBs vis-a-vis that used 
by RBs. KBs and PDBs are more risk averse than RBs in choosing 
loan applicants and to some extent, are much less committed to 
local level lending activity than RBs. 
In the subsequent stages, two types of credit rationing were 
observed among KBs, PDBs, and RBs, namely: strong credit 
rationing entailing outright rejection (i.e., the first ration-
ing stage following the initial screening activity) and weak 
credit rationing (i.e., the second rationing stage) wherein the 
14 
borrower was not rejected but given a loan less than the amount 
applied for. The incidence of strong first stage credit ration-
ing was higher in PDBs and KBs than in RBs, as indicated by the 
lower index of loan approval rates in KBs and PDBs compared to 
RBs. On the other hand, RBs engaged in significant quantity 
rationing during the third and last stage of rationing. 
Restrictions in data availability prevented the use of eco-
nometric tests on the determinants of the stronger version of 
credit rationing (i.e. approval or rejection), since banks 
generally do not keep a profile of rejected applicants. This 
presents a potentially promising research area for interested 
researchers who could gain bank cooperation to empirically test 
in detail the determinants of the stronger type of credit 
rationing in selected banks in the Philippines. 
Previous studies have shown that government market interven-
tion designed to enhance access to credit for small borrowers is 
counter productive. The results of this survey, however, suggest 
that market-oriented credit policies (with appropriately realis-
tic interest rates) are likely to be similarly limited in 
expanding access to small or marginal borrowers due to the 
constraints imposed on the system through imperfect information. 
Since asymmetric information is inherent in less developed 
financial markets, alternative solutions have to be devised to 
circumvent the constraint posed by this market imperfection. But 
there is no simple solution. At best, measures which can help 
reduce risks and minimize the costs of acquiring information may 
have to be initiated. These could include the use of NGO's or 
PVO's to sort out and prepare a roster of "good" small farmer 
clientele for banks. The existing guarantee programs which can 
help reduce the risks of banks may also have to be streamlined 
and efficiently implemented to better serve their target 
beneficiaries. To some extent, promoting rural credit unions 
creates the potential for an institutional actor that could 
serve a large number of this marginal clientele. 
A final issue merits comment in this conclusion, namely, the 
troublesome link between the findings on credit rationing in this 
study and the prospective Executive Order on land reform. All 
banks (including RBs) engage in various forms of credit rationing 
as a normal and necessary business practice. Collateral is an 
important determinant of rationing behavior and the consequent 
supply of credit through the banking system. Land mortgages have 
been the most important form of collateral used by banks 
influencing their rationing behavior. Through its impact on the 
value of land-based collateral, the impending legislation on land 
reform could possibly affect the future viability of institutions 
supplying rural financial services and seriously restrict the 
future supply of credit to agricultural producers. 
ti 
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The viability of rural financjal instjtutions will be 
affected through the declining value of the collateral assets 
(i.e .. mortgaged property) they currently have included in their 
on-going loan contracts and the foreclosed land assets they 
currently hold in their portfolio. In the former case, farmers 
owning more than seven hectares may stop repaying the bank on 
their loans that were secured by these land titles on the 
assumption that they will lose their land through land expropria-
tion measures. 
Similarly, banks owning foreclosed rural properties are also 
subject to expropriation measures. Furthermore, the valuation of 
these assets for the purposes of future government repayment will 
likely be below the value of the original principal and interest 
payments. In any event, the ten-year repayment schedule for 
expropriated land will stretch out the cash flow to banks to 
such an extent that their earnings are bound to be affected by 
such actions on their foreclosed land. 
Finally, in the area of new loans to agricultural producers 
in the post-reform era, the question arises whether the agrarian 
reform beneficiaries will have full title to their properties or 
whether they can pledge these properties as forecloseable 
collateral for bank loans. If not, banks will back off from 
making loans to the land reform beneficiaries unless effective 
collateral substitutes can be found for land titles. 
The above discussion underscores the potential for sig-
nificant negative externalities through the financial sector in 
the current legislative scenario for land reform. These 
negative externalities should be taken into consideration in 
designing measures to promote reform. Otherwise, authorities may 
have to face the unpleasant consequences of little to no 
agricultural credit being supplied to the reform beneficiaries 
and a weakened financial sector unable and unwilling to expand 
financial services in rural areas. 
16 
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